

AD-A266 647



NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

DTIC
ELECTE
JUL 12 1993
S C D

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE
COMPONENT GROUND FORCES

by

1
Harry T. Williams
Lieutenant Colonel
United States Marine Corps Reserve

18 June 1993

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Harry T. Williams

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release:
Distribution Unlimited


93 7 09 03 2

93-15655



30p8

DISCLAIMER NOTICE



THIS DOCUMENT IS BEST
QUALITY AVAILABLE. THE COPY
FURNISHED TO DTIC CONTAINED
A SIGNIFICANT NUMBER OF
PAGES WHICH DO NOT
REPRODUCE LEGIBLY.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS None	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY N/A		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE N/A			
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) N/A	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION N/A	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) N/A	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION N/A	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) N/A	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER N/A	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) N/A		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Operational Considerations on the Employment of Reserve Component Ground Forces (U)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LtCol. Harry T. Williams, USMCR			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b. TIME COVERED FROM N/A TO N/A	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 18 June 1993	15. PAGE COUNT 24
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The deployment and employment of large reserve component ground combat organizations can effect planning and execution at the operational level of war. While reserve component organizations are not the ideal choice in terms of capabilities and training levels, there may be no options in certain scenarios. Historical trends since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 through the 1991 Gulf War indicate that the deployment of large reserve units to an operational theater is a possibility that cannot be dismissed. The immediate and direct effects can be felt in the areas of operational level synchronization and agility. Given the more limited capabilities of large reserve component units, and their sub- sequent effect on the capabilities of the force as a whole, the operational commander may need to consider modifications to his campaign plan. He may also want to carefully consider deployment phasing, broad training guidance and the timing of campaign initiation.			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

Abstract of
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT
GROUND FORCES

The deployment and employment of large reserve component ground combat organizations can affect planning and execution at the operational level of war. While these organizations are not the ideal choice in terms of capabilities and training levels, the operational level commander may not have a choice in certain scenarios. Historical trends since the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 through the 1991 Gulf War indicate that the deployment of large reserve component units to an operational theater is a definite possibility that cannot be dismissed. The immediate and direct effects can be felt in the areas of operational level synchronization and agility. Given the more limited capabilities of large reserve component units, and their subsequent effect on the capabilities of the force as a whole, the operational commander may need to consider modifications to his campaign plan. He may also want to consider those factors over which he has some control - deployment into the theater, broad training guidance, campaign initiation - so as to shape his force and his campaign plan in a synchronous manner.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED B

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC	TAB <input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
ABSTRACT.....	ii
I INTRODUCTION	1
II BACKGROUND	3
III OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - SYNCHRONIZATION	11
IV OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - AGILITY	15
V RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION	19
ENDNOTES	23
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	26

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF RESERVE COMPONENT GROUND FORCES

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The deployment and employment of reserve component forces can affect planning and execution at the operational level of war. Effects can be both immediate and delayed, direct and indirect. The operational level commander and his staff must be aware of these effects - only then can the potential complications be anticipated and factored into the planning and execution process.

The primary focus of this paper will be on the immediate and direct effects, especially as they pertain to synchronization and agility at the operational level of war. Other factors will also be considered, especially as they apply to operational deployment, broad training guidance, and campaign initiation. The focus will be on relatively large - brigade level or equivalent - reserve component ground combat units and the possible operational level effects of employing these maneuver units such as infantry, mechanized infantry, armor, or armored cavalry.¹

It is these reserve component maneuver units that are historically the most controversial and difficult to integrate with existing regular units at the operational or tactical level. It is these formations that require a high degree of command and

staff expertise implicit in the assignment and execution of standard tactical missions.²

Two services possess such units - the United States Army and the United States Marine Corps. They exist in three separate reserve components - the Army Reserve, the Army National Guard, and the Marine Corps Reserve. For the purposes of this study, the various reserve components will be addressed in a generic manner, unless otherwise specified. In a broad sense, all ground combat units share basic common characteristics. They are organized and trained to fight on land. Extreme violence and adverse living conditions are the assumed norms. Effective leadership, discipline, esprit de corps, and unit cohesion are absolutely essential for mission accomplishment and survival in a combat environment. In this respect, ground combat units - Army and Marine, regular and reserve - are similar.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The traditional role of reserve ground combat forces has been to "... supplement active units in any especially large or protracted deployment...providing latent combat capability that can be made ready when needed."¹ Following from this, it has been generally understood that "... certain reserve units must be maintained at high readiness to assist and augment responding active units."² The decision to mobilize and deploy reserve component formations is a political one. As such, it involves policy and strategy considerations. Since the decision to mobilize the reserves is a political decision and is made at the highest levels of government, the operational level commander will probably not be involved. Conversely, the physical integration and tactical employment of reserve component formations is, essentially, a challenge for tactical level commanders.

What, then, are operational level considerations? Is the operational level commander properly concerned with reserve component employment complications since they are either strategic or tactical in nature? The answer is "yes", because employment of large reserve component ground units has potential impact on planning and execution at the operational level of war.

Broad national policy concerning the role of the reserve component will probably remain within traditional parameters. Although the Clinton administration has yet to issue its own

national security strategy, no surprises concerning the reserves are anticipated. Given the new administration's statements to date, given the political and economic inclinations of Congress to maintain reserve component force structure, and given the shrinking size of the active establishment, it would appear that the basic role of the reserve components will remain constant for the foreseeable future.

Currently, approximately forty-three percent of the Total Force ground combat units are located in the reserve components.³ Under the Bush administration's Base Force proposal, put forth in 1992, about forty percent of the Base Force ground combat units would have resided in some type of reserve or cadre status by 1995.⁴ These figures will undoubtedly change, reflecting the Clinton administration's priorities. However, will the percentages be significantly altered? Probably not. In fact, the relative percentages may even slightly increase in favor of certain types of reserve component formations.

What are the implications for operational level commanders? Given the current reduction of the regular establishment and the numerous regional tensions of the post-Cold War era, the requirement for reserve component ground units may actually increase in certain scenarios, especially those involving multiple regional crises. Examples of some scenarios requiring the activation, deployment and possible employment of large reserve component ground units are: a major regional contingency of a protracted nature involving significant numbers of United States ground forces (a "Desert Storm" in which the enemy fights

effectively); a major regional contingency plus a concurrent lesser regional contingency (a "Desert Storm" plus a Somalia-type "Provide Hope"); or, concurrent lesser regional contingencies of a prolonged nature requiring activated reserve component units to physically substitute for deployed regular units.

None of these scenarios necessarily requires the commitment of large reserve component combat units directly into the combat or contingency operations themselves. However, some reserve component ground units may be involved, directly or indirectly, in such a way as to have an effect on operational level planning. For example, operational commanders in quiet theaters may be apportioned or assigned reserve component units in lieu of committed regular units.

Operation "Desert Storm" is illustrative of several recurring themes and options involving the employment of reserve component ground units. In terms of direct involvement, only two National Guard field artillery brigades participated in the Army's portion of the ground campaign. The Marine Corps integrated numerous Marine Corps Reserve (USMCR) armor and artillery units into regular organizations at the company/battery level. Two USMCR infantry battalions and a regimental headquarters were employed in necessary, but ancillary roles. The battalions were employed in rear area security and prisoner of war handling. The regimental headquarters also was employed in a rear area security mission.

Was this reserve component involvement significant? At the political and tactical level, it was. At the operational level,

since the ground campaign unfolded quickly, it was not. However, what if the campaign had progressed slowly and more combat formations were needed? Where would they have come from? It can be argued that, at this point, serious consideration would have been given to the introduction of some of the National Guard maneuver brigades that had been mobilized, but not yet deployed from the continental United States. Such a decision would have been significant at the operational level of war, especially as related to synchronization and agility.

There is, however, an established and understandable reluctance by the senior military leadership to employ large reserve formations on the battlefield. This is historically rooted as far back as the Korean War.⁵ General Colin Powell recently articulated one aspect of that traditional reluctance. "We also need active forces when we are talking about combined arms forces - mechanized divisions, armored divisions - the most sophisticated units... For that kind of proficiency, for that kind of ability to integrate all the armed forces, you need active units that train every day all year long."⁶ This insight encompasses both operational and tactical considerations.

Decisions made during the Gulf War highlighted the traditional reluctance to employ large reserve component units. Two of the Army divisions which initially deployed to Saudi Arabia - the 24th Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Cavalry Division - did so without their National Guard roundout brigades. Instead, active duty brigades were substituted.⁷

There is still controversy about the actual readiness status of the two National Guard roundout brigades left behind. Some argue that institutional bias and hidden agendas influenced the decision not to deploy them.⁹ The accuracy of this claim is irrelevant. The common perception is that they were not sufficiently ready. The perception has become reality. As one commentator has observed, the "... National Guard brigades ... were not ready to go and had to be replaced with active Army units. And when the two National Guard units finally were activated, they were deemed unready for combat and dispatched to the National Training Center in the Mojave Desert. It is an issue which must be resolved because current plans call for one-third of the Army's existing combat divisions to be placed in the reserve forces."¹⁰

That is the crux of the challenge. The operational level commander may have to utilize reserve component ground units in certain planning or employment scenarios. He may not want to; however, there may be no choice. Yet, reserve ground units are perceived as being less "combat ready" than their active counterparts. What, if anything, can the operational level commander do about this? Without a doubt, reserve component ground combat units are less proficient across the spectrum of training readiness. However, they do possess a certain degree of capability and, given sufficient time and training, could be brought up to a more competitive level of readiness. Contingency requirements, however, may limit those training opportunities.

As a result, senior military leaders have been historically reluctant to employ large reserve component formations in combat. Risk and uncertainty are enhanced, especially in the areas of operational level synchronization and agility. For this reason, among others, post-World War II "... reserve force policy has been one of the most contentious, unsettled, complicated, and perplexing aspects of the national defense calculus."¹⁰

From a recent historical perspective, large reserve component ground combat formations have played roles in several post-World War II contingencies. In the Korean War, both the Army and Marine Corps employed large numbers of activated reserve personnel. The techniques of employment varied. As a foreshadowing of trends which would manifest themselves again some forty years later in the 1991 Gulf War, the Army's focus was primarily on large units. Four reserve divisions were mobilized in 1950. The 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions were eventually deployed to Japan for further training. They entered combat, as units, in December 1951 and January 1952. The other two activated divisions were deployed to the European theatre in November 1951.¹¹

The Marine Corps, in contrast, employed an alternative approach. Large numbers of Marine Reservists were activated and used to bring understrength active units up to combat strength. While the contribution of Marine Reservists was invaluable, no large Marine Corps Reserve units were deployed as units. This would also foreshadow events in the Gulf War of 1991.

Large reserve component units were mobilized during the Berlin Crisis. Four National Guard combat divisions were among the various organizations activated in late 1961.¹² While none of the divisions were actually deployed into operational theaters, they were part of a strong political response by the United States government to Soviet pressure in Berlin. In retrospect, these mobilized units constituted more of a political statement than a military capability.

Contrary to popular perceptions, some reserve component formations were activated in 1968 during the Vietnam War. In response to the Pueblo Incident in January 1968, aviation units from the Air Force Reserve, Air National Guard, and the Naval Air Reserve were mobilized. Of more potential significance at the operational level of war, however, was the fact that two National Guard combat brigades were mobilized a few weeks later in response to the communist Tet Offensive in Vietnam. As with the large reserve units activated during the Berlin Crisis, they were not deployed, as units, outside of the United States. One brigade was eventually demobilized, while the other replaced a regular brigade of the 5th Infantry Division that had been deployed to Vietnam.¹³

Two generalized observations relative to the operational level of war can be drawn from these historical precedents. First, large reserve combat formations are a tool that has been "taken off the shelf" several times in the recent past. They may or may not have been subsequently deployed to operational theaters. However, mobilization made them available for planning

consideration and, therefore, of interest at the operational level. The reasons for mobilization may have been primarily military - as in the Korean War and the Gulf War. Or, the reasons may have been political - as in the Berlin Crisis or the 1968 mobilizations. Present-day operational level commanders and their staffs must be prepared for similar mobilizations and subsequent planning challenges in the future.

Secondly, readiness complications, both real and perceived, always accompany these large reserve unit mobilizations. Based on historical experience as recent as the 1991 Gulf War, there will always be readiness deficiencies. They are inherent in the nature of reserve forces and should not come as a surprise. Rather, they should be expected and anticipated. Any readiness deficiencies will ultimately become the operational commander's problem once the reserve units are assigned to his theater. He must be prepared to deal with the operational level effects in a realistic, constructive manner as he begins to assess the immediate impact that these reserve units may have on his campaign planning and execution. These effects will be felt in the areas of operational synchronization and agility.

CHAPTER III

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - SYNCHRONIZATION

"Synchronization is the arrangement of battlefield activities in time, space and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point. Synchronization is both a process and a result. Commanders synchronize activities; they thereby produce synchronized operations."¹ This inherently difficult operational level challenge is made even more complex when the uncertain calculus of reserve component unit employment is considered.

The deployment and employment of large reserve component ground combat formations can affect operational level synchronization in several ways. The first difficulty is with integration and interoperability at the tactical level. While this complication is primarily a tactical concern, the impact can also be felt at the operational level. That is the key concern expressed by General Colin Powell when he referred to the need for highly trained, active duty combined arms formations that "train every day all year long."²

In direct contrast to General Powell's observation, however, Army planning during the late Cold War era envisioned employing Army National Guard maneuver brigades to "roundout" existing active divisions, including mechanized and armored divisions. This planning was rooted in the now outdated scenario in which the U.S. Army was to rapidly reinforce NATO in order to defend against the Warsaw Pact. In that scenario, the reserve component

brigades were absolutely essential. The apparent dichotomy is perplexing. In the late 1980s, the National Guard brigades were presumed to be sufficiently "ready" after just several weeks post-mobilization training to face the Soviets. Yet, they were not sufficiently "ready" to face the Iraqi Army in 1990.

Necessity was the difference. The reserve component brigades were not necessary in Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The divisions could be physically "rounded out" with regular instead of reserve brigades. Therefore, the National Guard brigades were left behind. While there were many factors contributing to this decision, including the political timing of reserve mobilization orders, synchronization concerns were undoubtedly an issue.

The largest reserve component element so far discussed in the context of synchronization has been a maneuver brigade. Usually commanded by a colonel, it is a tactical level unit. Normally, three maneuver brigades are assigned to a division, also a tactical level unit. Under the "roundout" concept, one designated National Guard brigade would join with two active duty brigades to complete the parent division's combat requirement for three brigades.

How do these tactical level issues translate to an operational level consideration? At the operational level, the concern is about possible degradation of the division's performance caused by having asymmetrically trained maneuver brigades. This could reduce operational synchronization, tempo and agility. Operational initiative could be thwarted by premature tactical culminating points. Army operational doctrine

is quite clear as to the relationship between training and synchronization: "Synchronization need not depend on explicit coordination if all forces involved fully understand the intent of the commander, and if they have developed and rehearsed well-conceived standard responses to anticipated contingencies... such implicit coordination may make the difference between victory and defeat."³

Another synchronization concern for the operational level commander and his staff when employing large reserve component combat formations has to do with the "... actual planning and coordination of movements ... and supporting activities."⁴ In this case, the dimension can be extended back to the mobilization process itself. As mentioned earlier, the decision to activate reserves is a political decision made by the National Command Authority. It is governed by legislation and detailed regulations. Policy and strategy factors, not operational ones, often drive the timing and implementation of this critical decision. The operational commander, however, will have to live with the operational consequences. He must anticipate and adjust as best he can.

To obtain the best synchronization and agility possible under the constraints of the campaign, the operational commander may want to control the pace of force integration. By analyzing the sequence in which his reserve component forces phase into the theater relative to operational synchronization, he can optimize tactical integration. The Time Phased Force Deployment Data List (TPFDDL) is his tool for doing this. The TPFDDL is normally

based on active duty unit assumptions which may not be as valid for reserve component units because they originate from widely separate locations and do not train together frequently as cohesive units. If synchronization is of critical concern to the operational commander, he may require adjustments so that the phasing of reserve units better corresponds to the requirements of his campaign plan. As FM-100 observes, synchronization "... takes place first in the mind of the commander..."⁵

Specifically, the operational commander must envision his campaign plan in the light of potential synchronization and agility degradation caused by the use of reserve component formations. Will the campaign plan need to be modified? The key issue here is not small unit combat readiness, but rather the level of training and sophistication of the large unit leadership - the brigade level commanders and their staffs. He can reduce some of the synchronization friction by ensuring that these key leadership cells are as well prepared as possible.

In some scenarios, the operational commander may decide that the best way to prepare the key reserve component leadership is to get them in theatre as soon as possible. This would enhance "bonding" and unit integration at the tactical level. Furthermore, it would enhance "situational awareness" and focus training priorities for the reserve component staffs. In this way, tactical plans could be altered as required to allow for the strengths and weaknesses of the reserve units. These alterations, in turn, may necessitate adjustments to operational level plans.

CHAPTER IV

OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS - AGILITY

Agility refers to the ability of units to "... be physically and psychologically capable of responding to changing requirements..." faster than the enemy.¹ Also referred to as "operational tempo", it is "...the ability to consistently shift quickly from one ... action to another."² Agility, like synchronization, has both tactical and operational attributes. In this case, we are concerned with the relationship of agility to reserve component employment at the operational level of war.

As with synchronization, the deployment and employment of large reserve component ground formations can affect operational level agility in several ways. The first effect devolves from integration and interoperability at the tactical level. While this is primarily a tactical concern, its impact is felt at the operational level, also. The total capability of large tactical units, such as divisions, could be degraded by having component formations at differing levels of training and capability. The formations at a lesser level of capability - presumably the reserve component units - would not be able to operate at the same "operational tempo" as the regular units. Their staff action cycle and ability to react quickly on the dynamic, fluid battlefield envisioned by current doctrine is assumed to be deficient relative to well-trained regular units. The common assumption is that command and staff functions are the weak link in large reserve ground units.

Recent experience from the Gulf War illustrates this point. Regarding the Gulf War, the observation has been made that "...large, stand-alone National Guard brigades were unable to deploy. Conversely, Marine Corps reserve combat units were efficiently integrated into the force."³ Ignoring service labels, one could conclude that large reserve ground combat units were considered to be less than fully combat ready, whereas smaller, company-sized units were more acceptably ready.

In contrast to the Army's approach, the Marine Corps utilized thousands of ground combat reservists in Operation Desert Storm. They were integrated into regular formations at the company/battery level or lower. Reserve combat battalions were activated in company/battery sized elements and woven, by unit, into existing active duty formations. This worked well. "Desert Storm has clearly proven the efficiency of the Marine Corps' Total Force policy ... not only were the reserves fully integrated in the initial breach and close quarters battle in Kuwait ... They quickly integrated with their active component partners, and in some cases outshined them!"⁴

The following example illustrates the high level of readiness that can be maintained by reserve component company-sized units:

"Our Reserves performed well. Perhaps the best example of effectiveness of this is found in Company B of the 4th Tank Battalion from Yakima, Washington. This unit had been equipped with M60A1 tanks, a system that is far different than the more modern M1A1. After this unit was activated in November, it completed a 23-day M1A1 training program in just 18 days. The unit arrived in Saudi Arabia on 19 February and went into battle on 24 February. In four engagements during the course of the war Company B destroyed 59 enemy tanks, about half of

which were T-72s."⁵

Upon closer examination, however, the Marine Corps actually manifested the same reluctance to employ large reserve units as did the Army. Marine Reserve ground combat units of battalion size or larger were not committed to maneuver combat as a unit. Marine Reserve infantry battalions were employed, as units, for such missions as rear area security or prisoner of war handling. They were not employed as maneuver units.

Based on projected observations from our most recent war, some tentative readiness expectations can be inferred. A direct relationship exists between reserve unit size and readiness. The larger the tactical unit, the longer it takes to achieve an acceptable readiness level. The smallest reserve ground command, a company/battery, can usually be combat ready in a matter of two to four weeks. The Marine Corps validated this when company sized reserve commands were successfully integrated into active battalions during Desert Shield/Desert Storm. On the other end of the spectrum, National Guard maneuver brigades were perceived as not being ready. The emerging opinion holds that it will take "three or four months" for a reserve maneuver brigade to be brought up to an acceptable level of readiness. Divisions will take even longer, perhaps "about a year".⁶

Opinions vary about reserve combat battalions. Recent Gulf War experience provides few clues about battalion level readiness assumptions. While the Army's mobilization focus was at the brigade level, the Marine Corps focused on the other end of the unit spectrum - companies and batteries. Both services

essentially by-passed reserve battalions in the mobilization process. The Marines did employ reserve infantry battalions in Operation Desert Storm; however, they were not employed as combat maneuver units. The inference is that they were capable of some missions, but not others.

Based on these generalized observations, some time assumptions for post-activation readiness levels emerge ... for company-sized units - three to four weeks ... for battalions - about eight weeks. Brigade-sized elements will require around sixteen weeks while divisions will require up to one year. The key variable in this readiness equation is the presence of staffs dealing with increasingly sophisticated headquarters functions. At the operational level of war, the integration of company or battalion-sized reserve component units is of minor consequence. Brigade level units, however, begin to effect the planning calculus. Agility for the force as a whole becomes a matter of speculation, not calculation.

CHAPTER V

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The operational level commander has some flexibility concerning the employment of reserve component units. He must be aware of his options so that he can effectively synchronize the integration of his force to best support the campaign plan. Before he exercises any options, however, he should be aware of certain "baggage" that accompanies reserve component units.

Reserve combat units are not as ready across the capabilities spectrum as comparable regular units. While this fact is self-evident, it needs to be honestly recognized by all parties concerned. Gaining commanders should not be surprised by this fact - it is inherent in the nature of reserve service. The challenge is to quickly build on the strengths and capabilities that exist in the reserve units so as to best prepare them for their role in the campaign.

Related to synchronization and integration is another traditional problem - long standing attitudes and perceptions which reach far back into history. These antagonisms are especially strong in the Army, where the militia vs. active debate predates the Revolution. Of import to the operational level commander, and his tactical subordinates, are attitudes and perceptions which can add self-induced friction to staff functioning within the force. These should be avoided. Specifically, the operational level commander and his staff can

set the tone for a professional, harmonious relationship between the active and reserve component officers.

The perception is prevalent within the reserve components of " ... active component officer ... arrogance toward, and an ignorance of, the reserve component ..." to include " ... flagrant disdain for reserve component unit leadership."¹ Since synchronization begins "in the mind of the commander", and is manifested in "implicit coordination [that] may make the difference between victory and defeat", it stands to reason that all components of the force must work effectively together. There is no room for counter-productive bias in an operational theater.

Whereas the active community traditionally harbors arrogance and disdain, the reserves traditionally harbor unrealistic expectations about their own levels of readiness. While some of this is a product of a natural desire to enhance unit morale and identity, it can lead to serious complications with the active community upon mobilization. "Readiness" is a relative term, understood differently by different parties. The active component leadership is the final arbiter of "readiness" upon mobilization, and traditional differences in interpretation inevitably arise. Therefore, serious friction inevitably occurs along the chain of command, possibly undermining cohesion and, ultimately, synchronization.

Once the operational level commander is cognizant of some of the traditional "baggage" that will accompany his reserve formations, he can begin to exercise options in an informed

manner. In general, the operational level commander has four theoretical options available to him. The unique circumstances of a particular contingency or campaign may preclude one or more of them. However, he should conceptually review all four.

First, a fundamental option involves the size of reserve units to employ. This is the "big unit vs. small unit" question. At the tactical level, the choice is obvious - break down the reserve formations into small components and use them to fill active units. This eliminates the tactical synchronization and agility challenge of reserve unit command and control. It is the traditional Marine Corps approach. It works. At the operational level of war, however, such a decision may suboptimize tactical efficiency at the expense of operational flexibility. The operational commander has to weigh this decision very carefully, especially if he is contemplating a long, difficult campaign.

A second fundamental option involves the nature of the anticipated employment of the large reserve component formations. If the operational level commander decides to retain the inherent flexibility of large reserve units, he must provide general guidance on their employment to his tactical subordinates. He may opt to use them in necessary, but ancillary, roles. For example - rear area security, prisoner of war handling, or standard tactical missions of a supporting nature. This recognizes the asymmetrical level of training between reserve and active component units and maximizes the more limited capability of reserve formations. It also allows the reserve component command and control structure to continue to train up to a higher

standard. This could be critical in a long campaign where the reserve component units will eventually be committed to perform standard missions.

The third option involves training. The operational level commander must assess the type of training his force as a whole will ultimately require. This includes the unique requirements of his reserve component units in light of their role in the campaign. Does the operational level commander require tactical proficiency or operational flexibility throughout the campaign? This may drive the decision toward training in theater or out-of-theater. During what phase in the campaign are the reserve units required, and for what missions? Answers to these fundamental training questions may require TPFDD modifications.

The last option involves the campaign plan itself. Throughout this iterative process, the operational commander must consider modifying his campaign plan. This is a difficult decision which goes to the heart of synchronization and agility concerns. A campaign plan that does not correspond to the operational level capabilities and limitations of the force as a whole is an invitation to failure.

In conclusion, the deployment and employment of reserve component ground forces can have significant effects on planning and execution at the operational level of war. These effects are both immediate and delayed, direct and indirect. The operational level commander, and his staff, must be aware of these effects and anticipate and adjust for them.

ENDNOTES

Chapter I

¹ U.S. Army terminology is used throughout. These terms are generally understood and accurately reflect the purpose, organization, and equipment of the unit. For the sake of accuracy, however, it must be noted Marine Corps ground combat units are organized differently. For example, the Marine Corps possesses no mechanized infantry or armored cavalry units, as such. Neither does it possess armored units larger than battalion sized. The ground combat element of a Marine Expeditionary Force can be task organized in such a manner as to achieve some of the characteristics and attributes of mechanized infantry or light armored cavalry. For the purposes of this paper, a Marine regiment is considered to be the approximate equivalent of an Army brigade.

² "Maneuver" units are formations that are capable of independent tactical maneuver on the battlefield. They range from company sized units commanded by a captain to corps sized formations commanded by a lieutenant general. Maneuver units are assigned responsibility for areas of the battlefield defined by doctrinal control measures. Unlike combat support or combat service support unit commanders, maneuver unit commanders have full dimensional responsibility in time and space for their assigned areas. Staff planning must be comprehensive and rapid as maneuver units execute present missions while simultaneously planning multiple future missions. The complexity of command and staff responsibilities increases geometrically as one moves up the various echelons of command.

Chapter II

¹ George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 29.

² Colin Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 29.

³ Department of Defense, Defense 92 Almanac (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, September/October 1992), p. 16-17.

⁴ Powell, National Military Strategy, p. 19.

⁵ Lewis Sorley, "National Guard and Reserve Forces", 1991-1992 American Defense Annual, 1992, p. 184.

⁶ Colin Powell, "Reducing and Reshaping the Reserves", Defense 92 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May/June 1992), p. 3.

⁷ Robert L. Goldich, "Excerpts From Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves", Fundamentals of Force Planning, Volume II (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), p. 582.

⁸ Sorley, pp. 194-195.

⁹ Harry G. Summers, Jr., "How to Be the World's Policeman", Fundamentals of Force Planning, Volume II (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), p. 663.

¹⁰ Sorley, p. 183.

¹¹ Martin Binkin and William W. Kaufman, U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989), p. 42.

¹² Ibid., p. 44.

¹³ Ibid., p. 57.

Chapter III

¹ Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986), p. 17.

² Powell, Defense 92, May/June 1992, p. 3.

³ FM 100-5 Operations, p. 17.

⁴ Ibid., p. 17.

⁵ Ibid., p. 17.

Chapter IV

¹ FM 100-5 Operations, p. 16.

² Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, FMFM 1-1 Campaigning (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990), p. 17.

³ John M. Kirby, "Reserve Component Force Planning: What the Future Holds", Fundamentals of Force Planning, Volume II (Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991), p. 594.

⁴ United States Marine Corps, Concepts and Issues (Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992), p. 56.

⁵ Ibid., p. 56.

⁶ Powell, Defense 92, May/June 1992, p. 8.

Chapter V

¹ David E. Shaver, Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army Active and Reserve Component Harmony (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992), p. 3.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Binkin, Martin and Kaufman, William W. U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1989.
- Bush, George. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.
- Department of Defense. Defense 92 Almanac. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing office, 1992.
- Goldich, Robert L. "Excerpts From Iraq-Kuwait Crisis: U.S. Reserve Callup and Reliance on the Reserves". Fundamentals of Force Planning, Volume II. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army. FM 100-5 Operations. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986.
- Headquarters, United States Marine Corps. FMFM 1-1 Campaigning. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990.
- Kirby, John M. "Reserve Component Force Planning: What the Future Holds". Fundamentals of Force Planning, Volume II. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991.
- Powell, Colin. "Reducing and Reshaping the Reserves". Defense 92. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May/June 1992.
- Powell, Colin. The National Military Strategy of the United States. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992.
- Shaver, David E. Closing Ranks: The Secret of Army and Reserve Component Harmony. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992.
- Sorley, Lewis. "National Guard and Reserve Forces". 1991-1992 American Defense Annual, 1992.
- Summers, Harry G., Jr. "How to Be the World's Policeman". Fundamentals of Force Planning, Volume II. Newport, RI: Naval War College Press, 1991.
- United States Marine Corps. Concepts and Issues. Washington, DC: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1992.